Helping Our Peninsula's Environment

Burn Plan (RI/FS) Comments by Dilworth Consulting

Board of Directors

Monterey Bay Toxics Project

May 13, 2002

A. Purpose Missing

B. Threat Reduction Alternatives Needing Analysis

C. Ordnance Detection Alternatives Needing Analysis

D. Faulty And Unsupported Assumption That The Ecosystem Needs Fire

E. Burning Problems

F. Full Method Description Needed

G. Animals Threatened By This Action

H. Environmental Impact Quantification Absent

I. Capital vs. Operations Costs

J. RI/FS Bias

K. IA RI/FS Failures as an EIS Equivalent

L. Superfund Interim Action Plan For Ranges 43-48,

30a and Site OE-16

M. ATSDR Smoke Model Problems

N. Air Emission Technical Memo

O. Conclusion

As a Technical Advisor, I have been hired to analyze and critique the Final Remedial Investigation And Feasibility Study (RI/FS), the Technical Memorandum on Air Emissions, the Revised Draft Environmental Impact Report on the Air District's Smoke Management Plan, the ATSDR Health Consultation, the Superfund Proposed Plan and comments by Dr. William Mitchell.

The RI/FS is at the core of this process. In theory, all decisions must rely upon it. So, I begin with its review. I strongly agree with Mr. Mitchell's comments on the RI/FS's startling abundance and depth of serious deficiencies. I also agree with a majority of concerns raised by other Agencies. Agency comments are filled with vivid examples of this document's grim inadequacies. Even after using four times the amount of time for which I am hired, it is not possible to list (let alone describe) all the problems I have found. I will try to add only points not well covered by the other commenters.

1. PURPOSE MISSING

The project need and purpose are, in all important aspects, wholly undefined. Because there is no definition of the need it is ambiguous, unmeasurable, untestable and unachievable. When a goal is untestable (e.g. "Let's do better") one can irrefutably claim anything as helping. An undefined purpose is as meaningless as an unsubstantiated opinion. An opinion is not testable precisely because it is not clearly defined.

• Is the project purpose relieving the threat of the remaining UXO?
• Is the project purpose artificially restricted as in removing the threat of the remaining UXO?
• Is the project purpose even further restricted as in removing vegetation the threat of the vegetation?
• or is it something else.

"Imminent Threat" (p 1) is not defined.

• What is the quantified risk of the threat? 3 injuries and 1 serious injury?
• What is the time frame of the threat? Every 50 years? Each 500 years?
• What is the quantified threshold for when the problem is deemed solved?

There is no evidence of the need, let alone substantial evidence. Apparently the fundamental reason for this action and its analysis through the RI/FS is allegedly to "protect human health and the environment from an imminent threat..." (p 1). Yet, except for a single sentence on page 14 admitting that no one was harmed, there is no explanation or evidence for the need or purpose.

Lacking evidence and rationale for the need for the action makes it indefensible, arbitrary and capricious. That the burning project will cause human and environmental harm is abundantly obvious, yet glossed over in a similar manner.

These add up to an unneeded project that will cause potentially significant human and environmental harm costing about a minimum of some four million dollars. (RI/FS Appendix C)

The purpose and goals must be re-written with a clear definition and supported by at least some evidence. The project must be reanalyzed in light of a clear purpose and the documents must be re-written and then recirculated to agencies and the public.

Please note the subgoals must also be unambiguously clear. Is a goal to "view the ground surface" or to detect ordnance? I suggest that ordnance detection is the primary goal and visual confirmation is only a secondary goal. 

1. DIAGNOSIS MISSING

Vegetation removal is not an alternative - it is only one step in the process of one alternative.

The wrong level of alternatives analysis was used. It should focus on diagnosis first.

This proposed action is wrongly aimed as a vegetation clearance project and alternatives (as is vividly admitted by RI/FS Appendix A's Title). It should be a UXO clearance project with alternatives - which it is not.

At least the analysis contains an (inadequate) Potential Solution Alternatives Summary, but it is entirely missing any Problem Diagnosis.

To make an analogy with a meal having several parts (i.e. finding food, cooking, eating and cleanup) this project analysis should have several separate parts including Problem Diagnosis, Potential Solution Alternatives Summary, and a Full Description of Alternative Methods.

It has a crippling lack of a full description of any alternative including their preferred method.

Unfortunately, the document skips right past locating ordinance right to destroying vegetation (page 36). The purpose of vegetation clearing seems to be implied as obvious - yet is not explained.

The project proposes to burn or remove the vegetation (presumably in order to locate the UXO) by an undescribed method and then removing the UXO or destroying the UXO in place.

Alternative methods of locating the UXO without much vegetation, air or soil disturbance with magnetometer type sensors hung below aircraft such as helicopters, extremely low footprint pressure vehicles or aerostatic blimps is unrecognized.

If I may take the liberty of defining the project purpose as "relieving the threat of the remaining UXO" - at least one further alternative should be evaluated.

• Active Fencing is not and should be evaluated as an alternative. This would include automated human intrusion detection equipment and an immediate communication link to police on base.

1. ORDNANCE DETECTION ALTERNATIVES NEEDING ANALYSIS

If I take the liberty of artificially narrowing the definition of the project purpose to "removing the threat of the remaining UXO" the following alternatives should be evaluated.

• Simultaneous Detection, Mechanical Vegetation Clearance and Ordnance Removal

This would involve a coordinated team on foot (as described on page 51) or in armored vehicles, with detectors.

They first determine if there is any ordnance above ground in brush for the next 10-20 meter wide swath. Next, the surface is checked with hand held mine sweepers. When ordnance is found, the detection crew backs off and the disposal part of the team takes over.

• Infrared Detection.

• Multiple crews - for vegetation removal.

Why are such limited crew numbers provided for mechanical and manual removal? The number of teams can be easily multiplied by two or four to decrease time to threat relief.

• Temporary defoliants are specifically not evaluated but should be.
• Low and extremely low -footprint-pressure vehicles and platforms to softly and slowly maneuver over brush.

Low -footprint-pressure vehicles are used in the arctic, in deserts with cryptogamic soils and crusts, and in swamps and other delicate ecosystems where the damage of a single footstep could last for 50 years. A well known example is a hovercraft. Less well known are lightweight balloon tire vehicles. One-of-a-kind vehicles, or perhaps more accurately platforms, are used in tree top jungle canopy studies. These platforms use inflatable beams to spread their working payload weight over huge areas.

These could be used at Fort Ord to suspend and move detection equipment across the landscape.

Without accepting the faulty purpose and level of analysis, I have these concerns about the time frames.

Because it is exceedingly unclear what tasks or events would occur during any of the alternatives a graphical timeline is needed for each to compare the alternatives. The narrative thrown into the appendix is not helpful.

When does each start? Since intentional wildland burning can only be done during a 6 month window, perhaps other alternatives such as mechanical or manual can be started sooner and completed sooner even though the time in the field is longer. This should show the time to completion of relieving the threat by the active fencing alternative is by far the fastest.

When does each finish? When is the threat relieved (if that is indeed the purpose)?

With the Simultaneous Detection, Mechanical Vegetation Clearance and Ordnance Removal Alternative the threat is relieved as swatches similar to how a lawnmower treats a yard.

Several times the document asserts, without evidence, that cutting manually or mechanically "cannot be applied selectively" (e.g. A4). Any gardener or landscaper will laugh out loud at such an assertion as that is exactly what they do large scale every day.

Please remove these assertions and reanalyze the conclusions.

1. FAULTY AND UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTION THAT THE ECOSYSTEM NEEDS FIRE.

The Army Corp of Engineers 1997 Habitat Management Plan and this document both, without evidence, assume that natural (lightning caused) fires occur and burn everything on the order of every 30 to 50 years. This flies in the face of abundant evidence that lightning caused fires are rare - probably occurs less often than every 500 years, and potentially burn the entire base no more often than tens of thousands of years, if ever. 

"The lowest incidence of lightning fires in California, by far, in the 1970's decade occurred in the Santa Cruz/San Mateo, Sonoma and Monterey/San Benito County Ranger units according to a U.S. Forest Service analysis of some 76,000 fires throughout California (Keeley)." (Dilworth, citing Jon Keeley's 1982 work)

Backing this up are multiple lines of research including Burton L. Gordon's book which states "Having searched written records covering some 125 years (and consulted local park rangers and city fire departments), the writer concludes that it is impossible to extrapolate a credible natural burn cycle of less than 500 years for the coastal half of the Monterey Bay area-and for the inland half, less than 300 years."

Lightning strikes and rainfall generally increase as an air mass lifts to traverse land rising from the sea. Similarly, lightning strikes decrease in number as land forms lower to sea level (Gordon). Keeley's USFS study of 100,000 fires in California in the 1970's under USFS jurisdiction found less than one percent of lightning caused fires occurred below 250 meters (800 feet) in elevation. This must be tempered by the fact that Forest Service has relatively fewer lands at or near sea level. Unfortunately, CDF data covering more lower elevation lands did not include fire altitudes. As far as I can determine no part of the proposed burn areas exceeds 830 feet above sea level. Thus, lightning strikes causing natural fires at this location are highly likely exceedingly rare.

Fish & Wildlife Service stated "Burning...may have a positive effect because the maritime chaparral community that supports sand gilia and Monterey spineflower is adapted to occasional natural fires." FWS Mar 1999 p 14

Having completed two Freedom of Information Act requests on the Ventura office on exactly this information I can state there is no evidence in this record or at Fish & Wildlife Service (unless they withheld information which would be a violation of law) that any ESA listed plant species at Fort Ord needs fire for regeneration. The evidence that does exist, solidly refutes the FWS conclusion.

Further, consider the headline from a 30-Nov-2001press release announcing the December 2001 Conservation Biology issue focusing five articles on prescribed burning.

"New research shows that prescribed burning may be used too widely. The theory is that by reducing the unnatural fuel buildup caused by decades of fire suppression, prescribed burning reduces the risk of catastrophic fires. But, this theory doesn't fit all ecosystems and prescribed burning can sometimes cause more harm than good."

"Although prescription burning has proven to be a viable means of reducing fire hazard in some forest types, it is not appropriate for the boreal forests of Canada and the chaparral shrublands of southern California," says Jon Keeley of the USGS in Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Parks, Three Rivers, California. Keeley and other researchers explore fire management in five papers in the December issue of Conservation Biology.

This document fails even when it focuses on it improper but declared task. Since the prescribed burning alternative is clearly the focus of this document some questions of that preference need to be answered.

How long after the burn is started is it over so ordinance crews may begin? 4 hours, 4 days, 6 days, 6 months? The document is not clear.

How long after the burn ends will the ordnance detection and removal crews fully step onto the field? Hours, Days, months, years - never? This is never discussed, is not obvious, yet is critical to determining a preferable alternative.

What methods do the ordnance detection and removal crews use? Are they walking? (p 51)

Are they in armored vehicles? What detection equipment are they using? Is the equipment for detecting ordnance aboveground in brush different than equipment for ground and subsurface detection? These are never discussed, the answers are not apparent, yet are critical to determining a preferable alternative.

Burning will leave impenetrable brush skeletons! (p A18)

The document admits that all branches 2 inches in diameter and larger will remain after the burning and mechanical brush removal will be needed (some additional cutting may be necessary...). Worse, under ideal conditions to control burns and air pollution, cool, moist conditions, even less "very little woody material would be consumed."

This again needs an answer to subsequent ordinance detection - How will it be conducted? By hand mine detectors, visually as the analysis implies, or some other way?

How can burning be "the most effective method for reducing vegetation to within six inches of ground surface to allow for safe operation of OE detection equipment..."(p D2) when burning will leave impenetrable brush skeletons?

The Army acknowledges that "a second unnatural burn that took place before mature chaparral species could produce seeds could destroy the habitat permanently." (p D2)

Burning will cause Direct, Non-Incidental, deaths and "take" of legally protected and some unprotected animal and plant species and their habitats violating ESA Section 9 and other laws.

The US-Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) March 1999 Biological & Conference Opinion (BO) (which replaces all earlier versions) does not authorize, quantify or even address Incidental Take of most ESA protected animal species killed by, or their habitats destroyed by, intentional fire.

The US-Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) March 1999 Biological & Conference Opinion (BO) (which replaces all earlier versions) does not authorize, quantify or even address Incidental Take of any protected plant species killed by, or their habitats destroyed by, intentional fire. "The process of transferring lands will not directly result in take; therefore, none has been authorized." (BO p 19)

In an unusual oversight, the Fish & Wildlife Service fails to distinguish between take of individuals and take which diminishes a population. This results in a failure to recognize and prevent deaths and take of individuals of listed species.

• Unmentioned are the impacts to the special status animal species including the invertebrate, amphibian, 9 birds, 4 reptiles, and 2 mammals. (pg 9)
• Which, if any, of these animal species is dependent upon fire for reproduction? None.
• Which of these species would be killed or its habitat destroyed (ESA Take) by fire? All of them.

For example, Vernal Pool Fairy Shrimp (Branchinecta lynchi) is a Federally listed Threatened species. Its range includes the vernal pools of Monterey County and Fort Ord.

Fish & Wildlife stated "No ponds are expected to be disturbed." FWS Mar 1999 p 14 yet, fire could not only directly kill many individual Vernal Pool Fairy Shrimp, it will destroy its habitat, its nesting and sleeping areas, its food and could permanently destroy its habitat preventing its recovery. These direct ESA take impacts are wholly disregarded in all documents associated with the proposed burning project.

This species is known to inhabit Former Fort Ord, is on the CITIES Appendix II Threatened list. Many of its subspecies are Federally listed as Endangered (Felis Concolor), and it is Specially Protected in California by law due to a people's initiative (California Department of Fish and Game Code 4800 "The mountain lion is a specially protected mammal. It is unlawful to take, injure, possess, transport, import, or sell any mountain lion, part or product, except as provided.")

Burning could directly kill individuals, will destroy its habitat, its sleeping areas, its food such as deer. These impacts are wholly disregarded in all documents associated with the proposed burning project.

Burning could directly kill many individuals, will destroy its habitat, its nesting and sleeping areas, and its food. These direct ESA take impacts are wholly disregarded in all documents associated with the proposed burning project.

"The badger is an uncommon, permanent resident found throughout most of [California], except in the northwest area. It is most abundant in drier open stages of most shrub, forest, and herbaceous habitats." Caughley 1978, Analysis of vertebrate populations, p 200 John Wiley & Sons cited by California Department of Fish and Game "Furbearing and Nongame Mammal Trapping" ED, April 6, 2001

The Badger is on the California Department of Fish and Game's list of Species of Special Concern "because they have declined or disappeared in large sections of the state, particularly areas west of the Cascade-Sierra Navada mountain axis and in coastal basins of southern California." Id.

"Using a home range of one badger per square mile (the most conservative number), it is estimated that the low range end of the adult badger population is California is 96,362 badgers." Id.

Burning could directly kill individuals, will destroy its habitat, its nesting and sleeping areas, and its food. These direct ESA take impacts are wholly disregarded in all documents associated with the proposed burning project.

This species is State and Federally listed as Endangered which lives in Monterey County.

Burning could directly kill individuals, will destroy its habitat, its nesting and sleeping areas, and its food. These direct ESA take impacts are wholly disregarded in all documents associated with the proposed burning project.

Burning could directly destroy its habitat, its sleeping, estivating and nesting areas, and its food. These direct ESA take impacts are wholly disregarded in all documents associated with the proposed burning project.

The document seems to imply that Central Maritime Chaparral is an ESA listed plant. It is not because sadly the Endangered Species Act does not recognize ecosystem protection. Maritime chaparral is a plant community dominated by ceanothus and manzanita species; and chapparal, dominated by chamise.

Seaside Bird's Beak, Sand Gilia & Monterey Spineflower are the only officially ESA listed plant species in the proposed burn area.

Having read the included maps I find no evidence in the RI/FS that these three plant species exist on the target areas. What maps specifically identify Seaside Bird's Beak, Sand Gilia & Monterey Spineflower in the three areas to which this document applies?

My analysis of the HMP maps show no occurrence of any of the three officially listed species Seaside Bird's Beak, Sand Gilia & Monterey Spineflower) in area OE-16. This means there is no need to burn this area - even if one accepts the unsupported claim that the area "needs" burning. In addition, Seaside Bird's Beak appears to occur in only small areas of 43-48 and 30A. Sand Gilia does not occur at all in those areas. Even if one advocates prescribed burning this leaves those areas more open for non-burning alternatives.

• Most protected wildlife habitats are not mapped and should be.
• This RI/FS needs maps showing the three target areas and the occurrence of all protected species animals and plants because the overlap is not at all clear - even when I have all the maps.

The document claims fire causes seedlings regeneration of some 3,000 per acre as opposed to natural fire-free conditions at 29 seedlings per acre (e.g. p 44). This is used to argue that fire is not merely good for ecosystem health but mandatory for system health.

This is a extremely loose assertion which needs to be controlled. First two questions need to be answered -

• What is sufficient seedling density?

If nine (9) seedlings per acre per year is adequate - then 29 is three times what is needed and 3,000 per acre could be stifling or overcrowding. It should be noted that the document only gives data in two dimensions - seedlings per area. An ecosystem view would look at seedlings per area per time (e.g. seedlings per acre per year) to determine what is necessary over several different natural cycles. You can't force feed an ecosystem.

Are they listed or protected species? If so why aren't they described and quantified? If they are invasive species, they are ecologically harmful and weaken the intentional burning argument.

1. Environmental Impact Quantification Absent

The RI/FS document zips past environmental impacts as though fired from a gun.

For example - "Smoke would be generated for two days during the burn..." yet there is zero quantification of the smoke or its hazard.

Yet, the Habitat Management Plan seems to require vegetation burning which is known to ignite massive amounts of the UXO which is legally recognized as hazardous waste.

The only apparent legally available solution is to postpone burning until after the hazardous waste is removed.

Burning UXO as Hazardous Waste can not be called incidental when the Army knows it is "going off like popcorn" as described by firemen at the 1997 burns and since the (unstated) purpose of the project is to disarm the same ordnance that is exploding.

1. Capital vs. Operations Costs

EPA and DTSC both commented on lack of O & M costs.

The document confuses and mixes Capital costs and operations costs. Please have someone familiar with basic accounting fix this and recirculate a properly budgeted document.

2. Evacuation Plan

The inclusion of an Evacuation Plan should alert any normal person to the breathtakingly irresponsible tone of this project. Some $90 thousand dollars is budgeted - yet no actual plan is available.

3. Bias of the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study

I have evaluated hundreds of environmental analysis documents. On a scale of 0 to 10 where zero (0) is fully objective and ten (10) is fully biased I would rate the RI/FS at about a seven (7) on the Bias Scale which anyone should find unacceptable. (A five means enough information is available to begin an independent evaluation of alternatives.) I could give many bias examples but here are just two.

• "Burning would have beneficial impact on rare, threatened and endangered plants..." p 40
• "The intense fire associated with prescribed burn conditions may result in the detonation of surface or near-surface OE items." p 39

This first, supportive of the preferred burning action, claims certainty using "would" with little to no supporting evidence.

The second, which could undermine the preferred burning action, is dismissed as only faintly possible with "may" in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Functional equivalency of an EIS is only granted when EPA "engages in regulatory activities designed to protect the environment." (Bass & Herson) Functional equivalency has never been granted by courts for CERCLA activities. Id.

• Independent of whether this proposal has any environmental benefits, the Army's proposed action assuredly has clear (not potential) significant environmental impacts of smoke, poison oak smoke, and potentially toxic smoke, on hundreds and perhaps thousands of everyday downwind humans living on Highway 68 and in the Salinas Valley, children at Spreckels school, housebound and immobile older Americans, vital agricultural crops and workers and ESA listed animals. (See Appendix A for a narrative of likely significant environmental impacts from intentional burning)
• Inadequate Analysis. The document fully fails to analyze the impacts of the project upon humans or special status animals other than a single sentence. (See Appendix A for a narrative of likely significant environmental impacts from intentional burning.)
• This action is admittedly one of at least two actions. NEPA clearly prohibits piecemealing.
• As described above this document does not have a complete and stable need or purpose description which prevents anyone from ever determining if the purpose has been achieved.
• NEPA requires mitigations whenever a project could potentially cause significant environmental impacts. The certain deaths of officially recognized imperiled animal species, and the clouds of poison oak smoke invading residential areas are probable significant environmental impacts, yet no mitigations are provided.
• The Evacuation "Plan" and the "Site-specific work plan ... will be available..." p 51 NEPA does not allow deferred studies or plans.

This document was placed in the wrong hands. What is the entirely predictable result when a fox is placed in a henhouse? The Army is composed of people who make mistakes just as we all do. The Army is biased and is blind to its own bias - just as we all are. In this case the lines between the responsible party and the Cleanup party have been harmfully blurred and to a large degree forgotten.

USEPA should take immediate control of this process and put have their own experts conduct repairs to the RI/FS if possible, or start over which is probably necessary.

Hearing the echoes of Hamilton Air Force base and the Army's recent lawsuit loss over open detonation at Sierra Army Deport - if USEPA fails to take immediate control, it may well be paving the way for years, if not decades, of litigation and inaction.

Sincerely,

David Dilworth, Technical Advisor

Keeley, Jon E., 1982. "Distribution of Lightning and Man Caused Wildfires in California", General Technical Report. PSW-58. Berkeley, CA: Pacific SW Forest and Range Experiment Station, USFS, U.S. DoA.

Simple smoke from burning vegetation has gases and particles deadly to normal people - independent of the poison oak smoke and the toxic smoke.

Poison Oak's smoke's harm is even harsher on children and elderly.

"Some explosives, when burned, emit toxic fumes." Former Fort Ord Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis pg 4-13

The August 25, 1997 event was only intended to burn 32 acres. It went out of control and incinerated 700 acres due to burning ordnance flying over the intended fire boundaries. The fire fighting crew had to be pulled back because "there was too much ordnance detonating." (Air District Report)

White hot, burning shrapnel will fly up to 4000 feet (almost a mile) and start secondary fires with 100 percent certainty. The Army's own EE/CA admits this and when questioned the ARMY reaffirmed this in a public meeting.

-end

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